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ABSTRACT
The current changes in business settings have directed companies to conduct businesses at the international level which 
requires the use of financial instruments. The mandatory MFRS 7, an adoption of IFRS 7 standard has been implemented for 
entities to disclose their involvement with financial instruments. Thus, the aim of this study is to investigate the financial 
instruments disclosure practices (FID) among Malaysian listed companies; specifically, on the level of compliance 
with MFRS 7. The overall results indicate that companies complied with MFRS 7, though there are several requirements 
omitted by companies. Furthermore, with the revision of Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2012, this 
study examines the association of corporate governance mechanisms (board expertise, audit committee independence, 
audit fee, external and internal audit functions) with the extent of FID among companies. Based on a total sample of 
319 Malaysian public listed companies for financial year end 2012, the analysis reveals that FID is significantly and 
positively associated with audit committee independence and external audit functions, while internal audit is negatively 
associated. Hence, it suggests that effective corporate governance is crucial as this is likely to have some influence on 
the extent of disclosure level among companies. 
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been significant developments 
of more complex and innovative financial instruments to 
cater for the needs of current business world (Zadeh & 
Eskandari 2012; Hunziker 2013). Financial instruments, 
either equity-based (i.e. shares) or debt-based (i.e. 
derivatives) are widely used by companies as a medium 
to raise more capital (Ismail & Rahman 2011). New risk 
management techniques and concepts have evolved for 
identifying, evaluating, and managing the exposure of risk 
arising from the financial instruments. Thus, there is a need 
for more relevant information on and greater transparency 
of an entity’s exposure in managing and controlling those 
risks (Zaluki & Hussin 2009). Potential stakeholders, 
particularly investors, are demanding such high quality 
information in order to make more informed decisions.
 For this reason, in August 2005, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 7 on financial 
instruments to provide guidelines to the extent of the 
disclosure required for entities involved with financial 
instruments. Previously, financial instruments disclosure 
was catered for under either IAS 30 Disclosure in the 
Financial Statements of Banks and similar Financial 
Institutions or IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Disclosure 
and Presentation. However, the IASB removed these 
duplicated disclosures as part of their revision, and 
simplified them to a single concentration standard known 
as IFRS 7. IFRS 7 defines a financial instrument as any 
contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one entity and 
a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. 
In line with international developments on this matter, 
Malaysian companies are also required to adhere to the 
regulation set by the Malaysian Accounting Standards 
Board (MASB). The MASB is the sole authority dealing 
with accounting standards in Malaysia. It has issued 
Malaysian Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS), fully 
IFRS-compliant standards, in order to be aligned with global 
accounting standardisation efforts. The full convergence 
process came into effect on 1 January 2012 and is to be 
applied by all Entities Other Than Private Entities (MASB 
2011). The convergence with IFRS, although challenging, 
will place Malaysian companies and the capital market at 
par with other international economies and markets (The 
Accountant 2008). Thus, firms that comply with MFRS 
standards would be expected to produce high quality 
accounting information, as numerous studies (Liu, Yao, 
Hu & Liu Olive 2011; Aubert & Grudnitski 2012) have 
shown that, by adopting IFRS, the overall financial reporting 
prepared by firms improves significantly.
 The MASB introduced MFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
Disclosure and the requirement to use it came into force on 
1st January 2012. It acts as a new standard to deal with the 
disclosure of financial instruments which was previously 
covered by FRS 132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentation. The decision to defer the implementation was 
made to give Malaysia a grace period to learn from other 
countries’ experiences (MASB 2005) as well as to provide 
a sufficient interval for companies to make necessary 
adjustments to their financial reporting (Zadeh & Eskandari 
2012). Generally, MFRS 7 provides two main disclosures 
that cater the need to disclose the significant level of the 
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financial instruments to the entities; and the qualitative 
and quantitative information on the exposure of risk faced 
to the entities’ financial statements. Additionally, MFRS 7 
has enhanced the disclosure on fair value measurements 
and liquidity risk to address the application issues as well 
as to provide sufficient information to users. The MFRS 7 
standard is a complementary to both other MFRS standards 
which are, MFRS 139 Financial Instruments: Recognition 
and Measurement and MFRS 132 Financial Instruments: 
Presentation. However, for the purpose of this study, we 
will only focus on MFRS 7. 
 The aim of this study is to examine the MFRS 7 
disclosure practices among Malaysian listed companies 
and their compliance level to MFRS 7. Unlike many 
prior studies, FID was examined either by using the prior 
standards such as MASB 24 (Hassan & Salleh 2010) and 
FRS 132 (Othman & Ameer 2009; Zadeh & Eskandari 
2012), or by focusing on voluntary disclosure (Bamber & 
McMeeking 2010; Ismail & Rahman, 2011). This study 
extends prior research by focusing on MFRS 7, the current 
globally-accepted accounting standard. In addition, this 
study complements a study conducted by Amran et al. 
(2009) which examined the factors associated with overall 
risk reporting, but did not cover the corporate governance 
elements. Thus, this study provides additional empirical 
evidence to the existing literature by investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance using several 
revised MCCG code in 2012, and the extent of a firm’s level 
of compliance with the MFRS 7. This paper is organised as 
follows: the subsequent section contains reviews of related 
literature and hypotheses development. Next, the research 
method is deliberately explained, followed by analysis of 
results and discussion. The final area will briefly explain 
the implication and conclusion of this study. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The pressure of business transactions and the rapid 
development of international market have increased 
the demand for more relevant information and greater 
transparency in financial reporting disclosure (Bischof 
2009; Savvides & Savvidou 2012; Elzahar & Hussainey 
2012). The risk exposure from financial instruments 
and how they are being managed are among the key 
elements needed. This detailed information is crucial to 
ensure financial statements are prepared to reflect the 
true financial position of the firms, and to assist users i.e. 
investors to make more informed judgement. Further, 
MFRS 7 has been initiated to provide such information 
to enable users to evaluate the nature, extent of risks 
and the significance of the financial instruments to the 
entity’s financial position. Prior literature has examined 
the financial instruments disclosure practices particularly 
on risk-related disclosure covering mandatory, voluntary, 
or combination of both types of risk-related disclosure. 
Findings indicate that companies tend to comply with the 
accounting standards mandated by the respective countries 
(Bischof 2009; Hassan & Salleh 2010; Probohudono, 
Tower & Rusmin 2013), while some studies show that 
extra disclosure is required to meet the additional rules and 
regulation (Bamber & McMeeking 2010). However, it is 
also documented that companies tend to partially comply, 
by omitting certain requirements in the standards (Othman 
& Ameer 2009; Savvides & Savvidou 2012; Zadeh & 
Eskandari 2012); and the disclosure practices vary in terms 
of type of the risk information disclosed, and the in-depth 
details of such information in the financial reporting (Ismail 
& Rahman 2011; Oliveira, Rodrigues & Craig 2011).
 Empirically, prior studies show that disclosure practices 
vary with respect to different settings across countries. 
This was due to different responses coming from various 
level of economic development (Probohudono  2013), the 
acceptability of each country on risk information (Bischof 
2009; Othman & Ameer 2009; Savvides & Savvidou 2012) 
as well as different level of enforcements and interpretation 
of the standards itself (Bischof 2009). Besides, prior studies 
suggest that the level of risk disclosure is associated 
with corporate governance characteristics (Taylor et al. 
2008; Oliveira et al. 2011), where firms with strong CG 
structure are more likely to be more effective in financial 
risk management, hence promote better transparency in 
financial reporting. Similarly, Alanezi and Albuloushi 
(2011) revealed that Kuwaiti firms with high level of 
compliance with the IFRS-mandatory disclosure are more 
likely to have good CG structure. 
 In Malaysia, Hassan and Salleh (2010) examined 
the disclosure quality using a self-developed disclosure 
index based on MASB 24 requirements; while, Othman 
and Ameer (2009) and Zadeh and Eskandari (2012) 
employed FRS 132. In general, there are no major areas 
and differences between these two standards; as the MASB 
standard was just renumbered and renamed (Lazar, Tay 
and Othman 2006) to FRS for international convergence 
purpose. However, results indicate that there are variation 
in the disclosure practices among companies on the nature 
and level of compliance to the standard; eventhough 
the convergence efforts to align Malaysian accounting 
standards to international standards already took place in 
2006. Thus, it is hoped that the adoption of IFRS into MFRS 
is able to enhance the compliance level among Malaysian 
companies as Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) has no power to exempt anyone (i.e. Malaysian 
public listed firms) from MFRS. To strengthen the quality of 
financial reporting, the recently-revised MCCG is expected 
to enhance the quality of information provided by the firms, 
which includes the need for better transparency of financial 
reporting and disclosure.
 While there is a wide range of studies (Oliveira 
et al. 2011; Elzahar & Hussainey 2012; Probohudono 
et al. 2013) concerning the relationship between CG 
mechanism and financial reporting, very little research 
has directly investigated or explored the link of CG with 
financial instruments disclosure. Hence, the current study 
expands existing risk-related literature by investigating the 
association of corporate governance mechanism with FID 
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practices among Malaysian companies. At the same time, 
this study contributes to the current literature by examining 
the MFRS 7 disclosure practices among companies. Agency 
theory provides a powerful theoretical framework in the 
study as financial reporting disclosure is among the cost-
effective monitoring tools in principle-agent relationship. 
It explains how information asymmetry between the 
shareholders (principles) and managers (agents) is 
mitigated through monitoring mechanism (Oliveira et al. 
2011). Furthermore, compliance with IFRS promulgated by 
the IASB is among the recommended practices to improve 
the principal-agent relationship as similar information 
would be transmitted to all parties (MASB 2005). 
 In this study, monitoring mechanism covers the four 
dimensions of corporate governance structure (Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004) which are comprised of 
the board, audit committee, external auditor and internal 
audit functions. The variables used are represented as 
board expertise (BEXP), audit committee independence 
(ACNED), external audit functions (EA), audit fees (AF), and 
internal audit functions (IA), which are consistent with prior 
studies (see Taylor et al. 2008; Oliveira et al. 2011; Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012; Probohudono et al. 2013). Control 
variables are useful in a research to take into consideration 
other relevant factors that might influence the variables of 
interests. Prior studies suggest that control variables are 
related to oversight mechanisms, in association with the 
level of disclosure, such as firm-specific characteristics. 
Therefore, firm size, firm leverage and firm complexity 
were used for the purposes of this study.
BOARD EXPERTISE (BEXP)
Prior literature recommends that board size affects 
board effectiveness in the sense of a larger board being 
more likely to have more knowledge and skills (Ismail 
and Rahman 2011; Elzahar and Hussainey 2012), but 
without an appropriate level of expertise among the 
board members, it will be a cost instead of a benefit to 
the firm. Further, Sulaiman (2013) suggests that the lack 
of relevant expertise among the board member could 
lead to a failure of a board to exercise its oversight duty, 
resulting in loss or damages to the company. Specifically, 
Sulaiman (2013) highlights the relevance of financial 
literacy or expertise among the board as it could improve 
board’s effectiveness. There is still a limited number of 
studies (Sulaiman 2013) that focus on board expertise, 
hence, this study extends the literature by including board 
expertise as the board has a role in ensuring corporate 
disclosure policies are in place. Consistently, the study 
predicts that firms with greater number of board members 
with accounting or finance expertise would enable them 
to better understand the financial reporting elements 
associated with better compliance with financial reporting 
standards. More specifically, the board with accounting or 
finance backgrounds, who by definition would have greater 
understanding on financial reporting requirements, would 
be motivated to ensure the firm is in compliance with the 
mandatory MFRS standards imposed. Similar with past 
studies (see Yatim, Kent & Clarkson 2006; Nelson 2010; 
Yasin & Nelson 2012), a positive association between 
board expertise and the level of compliance with MFRS 7 
is assumed, resulting in the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive association between the level of a 
firm’s compliance with MFRS 7 and board expertise
AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE (ACNED)
Given the diversification and complex nature of company, 
the board needs to delegate some of its monitoring 
responsibilities to another party within the firm, who can 
support and provide secondary control over the company 
operations (Oliveira et al. 2011). The board generally 
delegates financial reporting responsibilities to the audit 
committee and hence the audit committee is the mechanism 
most likely to provide shareholders with the greatest 
protection in maintaining the quality of a company’s 
financial statements and ensuring the entity complies 
with mandatory disclosures (Palmer 2008; Akhtaruddin & 
Haron 2010; MCCG 2012 ). Consistent with MCCG (2007) 
requirements, an effective audit committee needs to be in 
place and prior research indicates that the effectiveness 
of an audit committee is related to the extent to which the 
committee is independent (Oliveira et al. 2011; Elzahar & 
Hussainey 2011; Probohudono et al. 2013). The results of 
past studies reveal that a higher proportion of independent 
directors sitting in the audit committee would lead to 
greater monitoring over the board. The greater monitoring 
over board includes high compliance with the applicable 
standards and regulations imposed on the company (Palmer 
2008; Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; Oliveira et al. 2011; 
Elzahar & Hussainey 2011). Akhtaruddin and Haron, 
(2010) also suggest that higher level of compliance with 
the IFRS-required disclosures is found among companies 
with higher proportion of non-executive directors serving 
on their audit committee. Therefore, it is assumed that 
companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors sitting in the audit committee would lead to 
a higher level of compliance with MFRS 7. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:
H2:  There is a positive association between audit 
committee independence and the level of a firm’s 
compliance with MFRS 7.
EXTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONS (EA)
External auditors have a major role in ensuring that their 
clients comply with accounting standards and other 
regulations. Some audit committee and board members 
are likely to be unaware of all reporting requirements 
given the increasing complexity of accounting regulation 
in recent years (Palmer 2008). Thus, the external auditor 
is in a position to ensure that companies comply with 
applicable financial reporting requirements. Larger audit 
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firms (i.e. the Big Four) typically have more resources and 
expertise (Chen, Hsu, Huang & Yang 2013) as well as being 
more familiar with the applicable reporting requirements 
(Palmer 2008); hence engaging with Big Four audit firms 
could ensure high compliance with accounting standards 
and other regulations. In addition, agency theory predicts 
that the larger the company, the more complicated the 
organisational structure, and the higher the agency cost 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976); thus companies with high 
agency costs would tend to engage Big Four international 
auditing firms due to the higher quality offered (Chen 
et al. 2013). Subsequently, these large and well-known 
auditing firms (the Big Four) ensure high compliance with 
applicable financial reporting standards in order to maintain 
the audit firm’s reputation (Oliveira et al. 2011) and avoid 
reputational costs borne by them (George, Ferguson & 
Spear 2013). Consistent with the above findings, this 
study predicts that firms that engage with Big Four audit 
firms would tend to have greater compliance with MFRS 
7 disclosure requirements than those firms with non-Big 
Four audit services. Therefore, to test the impact of external 
audit functions on the level of a firm’s disclosure practice, 
the following hypothesis is developed:
H3: There is a positive association between firms 
audited by Big-Four audit firms and a firm’s level of 
compliance with MFRS 7
AUDIT FEES (AF)
Agency theory states that shareholders need to incur 
monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976), such as the 
cost of hiring the external auditor. This cost is better known 
as audit fees and is in place to minimise the agency cost 
(Cohen et al. 2004). Moreover, prior studies show that there 
is association between fees received by audit firms and the 
auditor’s independence, which will indirectly impact on the 
financial reporting decision (i.e. the extent of disclosure in 
annual reports). It is argued that a higher amount of audit 
fees indicates that auditors provide more thorough and 
efficient audit services (Yatim et al. 2006). Hence, more 
reliable information and a high level of compliance with 
accounting standards and other regulations are expected. 
Furthermore, George et al. (2013) found a significant 
increase in audit cost due to the IFRS adoption by the client 
companies. The increase in audit fees is attributed to an 
increase in auditing work, as additional effort is needed 
by the auditors. They further state that the additional cost 
incurred is to mitigate the risk of IFRS adoption such as 
the possibility of financial statements being materially 
misstated or not complying with applicable accounting 
standards. In addition, the auditors need to familiarise 
themselves with the applicable reporting requirements 
(Palmer 2008) and become knowledgeable about the new 
IFRS standards (George et al. 2013). This is a cost to the 
audit firms which contributes to higher fees charged to 
the clients. Therefore, consistent with above findings, this 
study predicts that higher audit fees are associated with 
a higher level of compliance with MFRS 7 among listed 
companies. The following hypothesis is developed to test 
this association.
H4: There is a positive association between audit fees and 
the level of a firm’s compliance with MFRS 7.
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONS (IA)
Consistent with the revised MCCG (2012), past studies 
(Cohen et al. 2004; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009; 
Kueppers & Sullivan 2013; Johl, Johl, Subramaniam 
& Cooper 2013) indicate that the independence of 
internal audit function is crucial to ensure the internal 
auditors are carrying out their function accordingly as 
well as to ensure that internal controls are operating 
effectively. In addition, the greater the independence 
level of internal audit functions, the greater the likelihood 
that the internal auditors can exercise their professional 
skepticism and remain objective (Christopher et al. 2009; 
Kueppers & Sullivan 2013). Therefore, this suggests 
that effective internal audit functions will lead to a high 
level of compliance with accounting standards and 
other regulations. Further, it is argued that firms that 
outsource their internal audit functions are less likely to 
be independent in comparison to companies that have their 
own in-house internal audit functions. This is because 
they may not be fully aware of the overall operation of 
the firms, hence, there is a tendency to internal influence 
by the management of the firm (Abdolmohammadi 2013), 
particularly if the internal auditor is new or has a conflict 
of interest, such as in a politically connected firm (Johl et 
al. 2013). Moreover, the level of independence could be 
impaired as they (the outsourced internal audit function) 
are being employed and paid directly by the company. 
However, prior studies also indicate that there are cases 
where outsourcing the internal audit functions provide 
more benefits to firms. As normally, firms would outsource 
their internal audit functions to a professional service 
provider, who can provide specialised resources, and thus 
be able to strengthen the internal control of the firms. 
Similarly, a study by Desai, Gerard and Tripathy (2011) 
found that external auditors assess the quality of outsourced 
IAF to be higher than the quality of an in-house IAF and thus 
are more willing to rely (to a greater extent) on outsourced 
IAF than in-house IAF. Accordingly, the study predicts 
that firms that outsource their internal audit functions are 
more likely to comply with MFRS requirements, given 
firms would outsource their internal audit functions to a 
professional service provider (i.e. accounting or auditing 
firms), who are more familiar with IFRS/MFRS standards 
and other financial reporting requirements. The following 
association is hypothesized. 
H5: There is a negative association between firms that have 
their own internal audit functions (in-house) and the 
level of the firms’ compliance with MFRS 7
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Although year 2012 marked the year for full adoption 
of MFRS by all public listed companies but there was an 
exception granted for several companies such as those 
entities that are within the scope of MFRS 141 Agriculture 
(MFRS 141) and IC Interpretation 15 Agreements for 
Construction of Real Estate (IC 15). In this case, these 
transitioning entities will be excluded in the sample 
as they are allowed to defer the adoption for another 2 
years. Moreover, consistent with prior studies (Bamber 
& McMeeking 2010; Ismail & Rahman 2011; Elzahar 
& Hussainey 2012), the sample also excludes financial 
industry due to different regulation attached to this sector, 
thus, the final sample consists of 319 companies. Data was 
hand collected from available annual reports on Bursa 
Malaysia website. This study employed the unweighted 
index or dichotomous scores whereby all information 
was equally valued regardless of the number of words, 
sentences, or the length of pages. The Financial Instrument 
Disclosure Checklist (FID) contains a total of 25 checklist 
items, which was self-developed based on the MFRS 7 
requirements. The items disclosed are coded as ‘1’ if a 
particular item is included in the checklist while ‘0’ is 
coded if not disclosed, consistent with prior studies (see 
Taylor et al. 2008; Othman and Ameer 2009; Savvides and 
Savvodiu 2012; Probohudono et al. 2013). The variables 
of measurements used are based on prior academic 
literature or relevant regulatory requirements (i.e., the 
MCCG code). Table 1 below represents the summary of the 
operationalisation of variables used in this study. They have 
been categorised into three types, which are dependent 
variables, independent variables and control variables.
RESULTS AND FINDINGS
Table 2 shows the overall mean score for FID is 80.76%, 
with the minimum and maximum score of 14% and 100% 
respectively. The results show that the disclosure level of 
Malaysian companies has slightly increased compared to 
prior studies by Othman and Ameer (2009) and Zadeh and 
Eskandari (2012). For the independent variables, they are 
mainly categorised into two sections, Panel A reports those 
for continuous variables, which includes the values of the 
mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation values 
of the variables, while, Panel B represents the frequency 
of dichotomous variables.
 The revised MCCG code (MCCG 2012) focuses on 
strengthening the roles and responsibilities of the board 
by having the appropriate composition of board members 
with the relevant expertise. In addition, in a dynamic and 
complex business environment, it is crucial for the directors 
in the board to have a certain level of accounting-related 
knowledge and to enhance their skills through appropriate 
continuing education programmers. This will enable the 
board to serve and sustain their active participation in 
board deliberations effectively (MCCG 2012). The data 
collected in this study have shown that on average, 28% 
of the board members have an accounting background 
and/or accounting-related experience. The maximum 
and minimum percentages of board members with an 
accounting background or accounting-related experience 
are 80% and 0%, respectively.
 Furthermore, it is a recommended practice under the 
MCCG 2007 for Malaysian companies to establish an audit 
committee, of which a portion comprises the directors 
in the board and the majority of the members need to be 
independent non-executive directors. The role of the audit 
committee is to provide further support to the board; hence, 
its members should be independent in order to discharge 
their functions effectively. The finding reveals one company 
failed to comply with the MCCG (2007) recommendations, 
given the minimum amount of 0 obtained from the ACNED 
variable results. This company mentioned in their annual 
report that they had not established any audit committee 
team but would rather outsource it to their parent company. 
However, it is permissible not to have audit committee for 
TABLE 1. Summary of Variables
Operational Measures Acronym
Independent Variable
Board Expertise The proportion of board members with accounting background or accounting 
related experience
BEXP
Audit Committee 
Independence
The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) in the audit 
committee team;
ACNED
External Auditor Assigned as1for firm’s audited by Big-Four and 0 for firm’s audited by non-Big Four EA
External Audit Fee Natural log of total value of audit fees paid to the external auditors by the firms AF
Internal Audit 
Functions
Assigned as 1 for in-house internal audit functions and 0 for outsourced internal 
audit functions
IA
Control Variables
Firm Size Natural log of firm size based on market capitalisation FSIZE
Firm Leverage Total value of debt to total assets FLEV
Firm Complexity Number of direct subsidiaries FCOMPLEX
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this type of company as it falls under real estate investment 
trust; hence, audit committees are not applicable (Bursa 
Malaysia 2013). On the other hands, the maximum of 
100% for ACNED indicates that all members sitting on the 
audit committee functions are independent non-executive 
directors, but, on average, the result obtained is 86%.
 With regard to external auditors, on average 54.20% 
of the companies, or a total of 173 companies, engaged 
the services of one of the Big Four audit firms, while 
the rest (45.80%) engaged a non-Big Four audit firm. In 
addition, to provide assurance to the board that the internal 
controls are operating effectively, the MCCG 2012 further 
enhances the governance practices which outline the need 
to establish internal audit functions reporting directly to the 
audit committee. However, based on the findings obtained, 
only 51.10% or a total of 163 from the total sample, have 
in-house internal audit functions while the rest outsource 
their internal audit functions to the outsiders.
 For control variables, the mean for firm size is 
RM1,851,707,432, which is proxied by market capitalisation, 
with a minimum amount of RM 1,949,700 and a maximum 
amount of RM56,069,660,672. The next variable used is 
firm leverage. Firm leverage is computed based on total 
liabilities over total assets; the mean obtained is 0.4%, while 
the maximum and minimum amounts are 1.69% and 0.03% 
respectively. Finally, the number of direct subsidies ranges 
from 0 to 101, with a mean of 9.93.
 In Table 3, the correlation analysis indicates that there 
is no evidence of high collinearity among the variables. 
The overall correlation analysis between dependent and 
independent variables suggests that MFRS 7 on financial 
instruments disclosure (FID) is positively and significantly 
correlated with external audit (EA) and audit fees (AF) 
at 0.177 and 0.297, respectively, while it is insignificant 
with the rest of independent variables which include board 
expertise (BEXP), audit committee independence (ACIND) 
and internal audit functions (IA). This result suggests 
that external auditors play a major role in ensuring high 
compliance among companies as they (external auditors) 
are expected to be more familiar with the reporting 
requirements. Some clients are likely to be unaware of all 
reporting requirements given the increasing complexity 
of accounting regulations in recent years (Palmer 2008). 
Hence, the external auditors are in a position to provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statement is prepared 
in accordance with the applicable MFRS standards and other 
regulations. Specifically, the finding indicates that firms 
that engage Big Four audit firms or, to some extent, firms 
with high audit fees tend to comply with MFRS 7 disclosure 
requirements, as compared to firms that employ non-Big 
Four audit services or ones which charge a lower audit 
fee. Further, the correlation table provides the correlation 
analysis between the dependent variable and the control 
variables. The result signifies that each of the control 
variables (FSIZE, FLEV and FCOMPLEX) is positively and 
significantly correlates with MFRS 7 on financial instrument 
disclosure (FID)
 On the other hand, the highest level of correlation 
among the independent variables (at 1% level) exists 
between external auditor (EA) and audit committee 
independence (-0.204), between audit fees (AF) and EA 
(0.424), and between internal audit functions (IA) with EA 
and AF, which represent 0.187 and 0.323 respectively. There 
is a significant relationship between all the independent 
variables and firm size (audit independence at -0.273; 
external audit functions at 0.454; audit fees at 0.618 and 
internal audit functions at 0.323) except for board expertise 
(-0.095). Similarly, for firm’s complexity, which is proxied 
by the number of direct subsidiaries, the result indicates 
that there is a significant correlation with all independent 
variables except board expertise (-0.009) and audit 
committee independence (-0.081). The figures are 0.163 for 
external audit functions, 0.530 for audit fees and 0.253 for 
internal audit functions. Moreover, only audit fee (0.287) is 
found to be highly correlated to the firm’s leverage, while the 
rest of independent variables are found to be insignificant.
TABLE 2. Descriptive analysis for all variables
Min Max Mean Std. Deviation
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
MFRS Disclosure Index (FID)
3 
(14%)
25
 (100%)
20.19 
(80.76%)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Panel A- Continuous Variable
BEXP (%)
ACNED
AF
FSIZE
FLEV
FCOMPLEX
0.00
0.00
8000
1,949,700
0.03
0
0.80 
1.00 
5,274,000 
56,069,660,672 
1.69 
101
0.28 
0.86 
381,373.57 
1,851,707,432 
0.40 
9.93
0.14
0.17
675,230.61
6,947,662,596
0.23
12.99
Panel B- Dichotomous Variable 
EA
IA
Freq (Big 4)
173
Freq (In-house)
163
%
54.20
%
51.10
Freq (Non-Big 4)
146
Freq (Outsource)
155
%
45.8
%
48.60
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 Table 4 provides a summary analysis of the multiple 
regression results obtained for this study. The F-value of 
the data is 6.698 and is statistically significant at 1% level, 
with the p-value of 0.000. Further, the explanatory power 
of the entire set of variables for this study is estimated 
by the adjusted R2 figures. The R2 value is the coefficient 
of determination; in this case, the R2 is represented by 
15.4%. It indicates that 15.4% of variation in the dependent 
variable is explained by the variation in the independent 
variables. In other words, it measures the degree of 
predictive accuracy of the regression model in explaining 
the variation in the dependent variable. Although the R2 is 
reported as having a low value, this seems consistent with 
prior studies in this financial reporting disclosure area, such 
as Hassan, Saleh and Rahman (2008), Said, Zainuddin and 
Haron (2009) and Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010). The R2 
values for all these studies are reported at 15.67%, 13% 
and 12.2% respectively
 The overall regression results show that two variables 
which are audit committee independence (ACNED) and 
external audit (EA) are significant and positively associated, 
while, internal audit (IA) is found to be negatively 
associated with the extent of MFRS 7 disclosure practices 
among the selected sample. For the rest of the independent 
variables and control variables, they are found to be 
insignificant in this study. External audit functions (EA) 
is the only variable that is strongly supported since it also 
shows a significant positive correlation in the correlation 
analysis, while the other two variables (ACNED and IA) 
are not significantly correlated with the extent of MFRS 7 
disclosure practices.
 The largest beta coefficient in this study is 0.276, 
which represents the external audit (EA) variables. This 
indicates that external audit function makes the strongest 
contribution in explaining the dependent variable (FID). 
Consistently, the p-value for EA shows a significant value 
at 1% level, which indicates the selection of external audit 
functions (Big Four or non-Big Four audit firms) is found to 
be positively associated with the firm’s level of compliance 
with MFRS 7. Thus, H4 is supported. The result is consistent 
with prior studies (see Oliveira et al. 2011; George et al. 
2013; Chen et al. 2013). External auditors play a valuable 
role in monitoring the contractual relationship between 
the entity and its stakeholders, as the auditor’s verification 
provides greater assurance about companies’ annual 
reports (KPMG 2012), and hence, reduces the information 
asymmetry in the agency relationship. Further, some audit 
committee and board members are likely to be unaware of 
all reporting requirements given the increasing complexity 
of accounting regulation in recent years (Palmer 2008). 
Thus, the external auditor is in a position to provide 
independent advice and ensure that companies comply with 
applicable financial reporting requirements (Palmer 2008). 
Hence, external auditors are expected to be independent, 
qualified and competent to carry out their duties in order to 
maintain the quality of audit services offered. Based on the 
findings, Big Four audit firms are more likely to ensure high 
compliance with applicable accounting standards among 
their clients as compared to non-Big Four firms, as they 
are internationally recognised, and have more resources 
and expertise (Chen et al. 2013).
 Similarly, the finding is consistent with agency theory 
prediction in which the larger the company, the more 
complicated the organisational structure, and the higher 
the agency cost. Thus, companies (with higher agency 
costs) would tend to engage Big Four auditing firms due 
to the higher quality of service offered (Jensen & Meckling 
1976). Subsequently, these large and well-known auditing 
firms (the Big Four) will ensure high compliance with 
applicable financial reporting standards among their clients 
in order to maintain the audit firm’s reputation (Oliveira 
et al. 2011) and avoid reputational costs borne by them 
(George et al. 2013). Therefore, firms that engage Big Four 
audit firms would have a greater tendency to comply with 
MFRS 7 disclosure requirements than firms with a non-Big 
Four audit service.
TABLE 3. Results of Correlation Analysis
FID (%) BEXP ACNED EA AF IA FSIZE FLEV FCOMPLEX
FID(%) 1 -0.079 0.059 0.177** 0.297** -0.004 0.198** 0.180** 0.201** 
BEXP 1 -0.028 -0.087 0.011 -0.094 -0.095 0.052 -0.009 
ACNED 1 -0.204** -0.135* -0.052 -0.273** -0.055 -0.081 
EA 1 0.424** 0.187** 0.454** 0.003 0.163** 
AF 1 0.323** 0.618** 0.287** 0.530** 
IA 1 0.323** 0.094 0.253** 
FSIZE 1 0.029 0.353** 
FLEV 1 0.180** 
FCOMPLEX 1
**, * Correlation is significant level at 1% and 5 % respectively level (2-tailed)
Note: FID= The percentage of MFRS 7 financial instruments disclosure items BEXP= The proportion of board members with accounting background or accounting 
related experience; ACNED: The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) in the audit committee team; AF: Natural log of total value of audit fees paid 
to the external auditors by the firms; EA: Assigned as1for firm’s audited by Big Four and 0 for firm’s audited by non-Big Four; IA: Assigned as 1 for in-house internal 
audit functions and 0 for outsourced internal audit functions; FSIZE: Natural log of firm size based on market capitalisation; FLEV: Total value of debt to total assets; 
FCOMPLEX: Number of direct subsidiaries
44 
 The MCCG (2007, 2012) highlights the need for 
an internal audit function to be independent, reliable 
and functioning in a timely manner. Consistently, the 
regression results obtained from the study suggest that the 
internal audit function (IA) appears to be able to influence 
the extent of firm’s disclosure practices, although, the 
correlation analysis shows an insignificant correlation 
between internal audit functions (IA) and firm’s disclosure 
practices (FID). The p-value and t-stat value for the internal 
audit (IA) variable are 0.003 and -3.011 respectively, 
hence, it shows a negative association at 1% level. 
Previously, the correlation analysis shows insignificant 
results as it is based on a linear relationship between 
the two variables (IA and FID only), while the regression 
analysis allows a more sophisticated exploration by 
taking into consideration the interrelationship among 
the set of other dependent variables (i.e. BEXP, ACNED, 
EA, AF) within the study. For that reason, regression 
results are considered more absolute and ideal as they 
take into consideration the complexity of business by 
providing information about the model as a whole and 
the relative contribution of each variable used to make 
up the model. In view of this, H5 is supported, as the 
regression results suggest that firms that outsource their 
internal audit functions to a professional service provider 
(i.e. an auditing or accounting firm) tends to comply more 
with MFRS 7 as compared to firms that have their own 
in-house internal audit functions. This is consistent with 
prior studies (see Desai et al. 2011; Abdolmohammadi 
2013) but contradicts with the revised MCCG (2012) 
recommendations. The revised MCCG (2012) states that 
companies should establish an internal audit function 
as one of the mechanisms to recognise and manage the 
risk. Hence, the regulators or standard setters would 
benefit from these findings as they shall consider the 
practicality of recommending an in-house internal audit 
function. Based on the findings from the study, it shows 
that firms that outsource their internal audit functions to 
a professional service provider are more likely to comply 
with MFRS 7 as compared to firms with in-house internal 
audit functions. In other words, outsourced internal audit 
functions provide better monitoring control as compared 
to in-house internal audit functions
 Furthermore, several past studies (Christopher et al. 
2009; Kueppers & Sullivan 2013) have empirically proved 
that the outsourced internal audit function is more likely 
to be independent as compared to the in-house internal 
audit function. The internal audit function needs to be 
independent to ensure the internal controls are operating 
effectively. The greater the independence level of the 
internal audit functions, the greater the likelihood that the 
internal auditors can exercise their professional skepticism 
and remain objective (Christopher et al. 2009; Kueppers 
& Sullivan 2013). Moreover, firms would outsource their 
internal audit functions to a professional service provider, 
who can provide specialised resources, such as an auditing 
or accounting firm (Desai et al. 2011; Abdolmohammadi 
2013). Thus, they should have the relevant qualification 
and appropriate experience that enable them to provide 
assurance to their clients that the internal controls are 
operating effectively. Effective internal controls include 
ensuring the financial reporting process (MCCG 2012) 
is in place, subsequently contributing to a high level of 
compliance with the applicable standards in the company.
 Similarly, the correlation analysis found a non-
significant relationship with audit committee independence, 
TABLE 4. Multivariate Regression Analysis
FID=β0 + β1 BEXP + β2 ACNED + β3 EA + β4AF+ β5 IA + β6 FSIZE + β7 FLEV+ β8FCOMPLEX + ε
Variable Beta/ Coefficients Significant (t-stat) (p-value )
Independent Variables (Constant) 
BEXP 
ACNED 
EA 
AF 
IA 
-0.056
0.121
0.276
0.076
-0.176
5.042
-1.030
2.146
3.289
1.214
-3.011
.000
0.304
0.033**
0.001***
0.226
0.003***
Control Variables FSIZE 
FLEV 
FCOMPLEX
0.053
0.090
0.067
0.699
1.557
0.067
0.485
0.121
0.067
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F-value 
p-value 
N 
0.154 
0.131 
6.698 
0.000*** 
319   
***, **significant at 1% and 5% respectively.
Note: FID= The percentage of MFRS 7 financial instruments disclosure items BEXP= The proportion of board members with accounting background 
or accounting related experience; ACNED: The proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) in the audit committee team; AF: Natural 
log of total value of audit fees paid to the external auditors by the firms; EA: Assigned as1for firm’s audited by Big Four and 0 for firm’s audited by 
non-Big Four; IA: Assigned as 1 for in-house internal audit functions and 0 for outsourced internal audit functions; FSIZE: Natural log of firm size 
based on market capitalisation; FLEV: Total value of debt to total assets; FCOMPLEX: Number of direct subsidiaries
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and this is supported in regression analysis. Therefore, H2 is 
supported. This posits that audit committee independence 
(ACNED) is not a stand-alone variable as it has a positive 
and significant association with the extent of firms’ 
disclosure at 5% level after taking into consideration 
other dependent variables in the regression model. Audit 
committee independence is proxied by the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors (INED) on the audit 
committee team. Hence, it indicates that the higher the 
proportion of independent non-executives directors in 
the audit committee, the higher the probability of firms’ 
compliance with MFRS 7 disclosure requirements. This is 
consistent with the recommendation of the MCCG (2007), 
that every public company should establish an audit 
committee comprising at least three members, the majority 
of whom are independent directors. Moreover, prior studies 
(see Oliveira et al. 2011; Akhtaruddin & Haron 2010; 
Probohudono et al. 2013) suggest that when there are 
more independent directors on the audit committee, it is 
likely that there will be more effective board monitoring. 
Hence, this would lead to a higher level of disclosure and 
indirectly contribute to a higher level of MFRS 7 compliance 
in companies.
 Moreover, among the aims of the revised MCCG (2012) 
is to strengthen the board structure and its composition, 
which includes having qualified and competent board 
members to manage the business operation effectively. An 
appropriate level of knowledge and adequate experience 
in accounting and finance are viewed as among the 
essential elements for the board members (Nelson 2010). 
However, the regression result in this study rejects H1, as 
it indicates that no significant association exists between 
board expertise and the extent of MFRS 7disclosure. This is 
consistent with Yasin and Nelson (2012) and could possibly 
be attributed to the minimal recommendation in the MCCG 
already being sufficient for Malaysian companies. The 
MCCG code recommends only that all members of the audit 
committee to be financially literate and that at least one 
should be a member of an accounting association or body. 
Therefore, the findings would be useful for regulators and 
companies to ensure the balanced structure of a board, as 
any excess or deficiency is a cost rather than a benefit to 
the firm. In contrast to the correlation results, the regression 
results found an insignificant relationship between the audit 
fee and the extent of MFRS 7 disclosure; thus H4 is rejected. 
H4 predicted that the higher the amount of audit fees, the 
more thorough and efficient the audit services offered by 
the external auditors. In other words, there is a positive 
association between audit fee and the level of a firm’s 
disclosure. However, the result in this study reveals a weak 
association between these variables. The result contradicts 
with George and Ferguson (2013), who claim that there has 
been a significant increase in audit fees due to the new IFRS 
implementation as more auditing works are needed. This 
contrasting result could be due to auditing fees having a 
minimal impact on the level of disclosure and that there are 
other relevant factors influencing the level of disclosure, 
which should be considered by companies. Moreover, this 
study suggests that companies should consider a reasonable 
audit fee to ensure the balance of cost and benefit received 
by companies.
 Nevertheless, the regression and the correlation 
analysis for the control variables (FSIZE, FLEV and 
FCOMPEX) show inconsistent results. The initial correlation 
results indicate that all the control variables are correlated 
with the dependent variable (FID), but, in the regression 
analysis, none of the control variables shows a significant 
relationship. Therefore, this signifies that although each 
control variable correlates to the firm’s disclosure practice, 
the impact is minimal and insignificant to the overall 
regression model. This is consistent with several prior 
studies (Hassan 2009; Oliveira et al. 2011; Miihkinen 2012; 
Elzahar & Hussainey 2012). 
CONCLUSION
The study provides recent empirical evidence on the MFRS 
7 disclosure practices among Malaysian listed companies. 
In general, most Malaysian companies comply with MFRS 
7, though some requirements are omitted such as hedge 
accounting information. This is consistent with Othman 
and Ameer (2009) who documented low level of hedge 
information due to the less involvement with hedging 
activities among Malaysian companies. The adoption 
of agency theory in this study suggests that mandatory 
disclosure is needed but will be effective only with the 
establishment of effective corporate governance and proper 
enforcement in place. Effective corporate governance 
(agents) is required to ensure adequate disclosures are 
made, resulting in the overall quality of financial reporting 
and ultimately protecting the interest of the shareholders 
(principals). Specifically, the results indicate that internal 
and external audit functions play a vital role in supporting 
the audit committee to ensure a high level of compliance 
and greater transparency of financial reporting disclosures. 
The findings are consistent with MCCG recommendations, 
which propose that audit committee members need to be 
independent in order to discharge their duties effectively 
and to strengthen the role of the auditing function within 
the firm. This study could be useful to regulators, standard 
setters, companies and market players in general as it 
empirically examines the impact of new MFRS adoption 
on the disclosure practices of Malaysian companies as 
well as highlighting the role of corporate governance in 
enhancing the level of corporate reporting disclosure. 
However, this study is subject to several limitations, such 
as the exclusion of the finance-related industry, and the 
limited data and research methods used which could be 
extended in future research.
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Item 
No
MFRS 7 on Financial Instruments Disclosure (FID) checklists Score
A)  Overview of MFRS 7
1 Disclosure of relevant scope of MFRS standards used for financial instruments 1
Classes of financial instruments and level of disclosure
2  - Categorisation of each financial instrument based on its nature & characteristics 1
3  - Initial recognition and measurements of each financial instruments 1
4  - Subsequent recognitions and measurements 1
B)  Significance of financial instruments for financial position and performance
Financial Position
5 a)  Categories of financial assets and financial liabilities 1
6 b)  The extent and nature of each underlying financial instrument, 1
7 c)  Significant terms and conditions that may affect the financial instruments 1
8 d)  Accounting policies and method adopted, including criteria for recognition and basis of measurement applied 1
9 a)  Disclose the following items of income, expense, gains or losses either in the statement of comprehensive income or in the 
notes.
1
Other Disclosures  
a)  Disclose each type of hedge described in MFRS 139, their fair values at the end of reporting period and the nature of the risks 
being hedged
 
10   Type of hedge as described in MFRS 139 1
11   Fair Values of hedge accounting at the end of reporting period 1
12   Describe the nature of the risk being hedged 1
b)  Disclose the fair values measurements using a fair value hierarchy; including the methods used, valuation techniques as well 
as the assumptions applied in determining the fair values of each financial instruments
 
13  Fair value measurements using a fair value hierarchy 1
14  Method and valuation techniques used 1
15  Assumptions applied in determining the fair value 1
C)  Nature and extent of risks arising from financial instruments
Qualitative Disclosures  
Credit Risk  
16 a)  the exposure to the risk and how it arises; 1
17 b)  its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the 
previous period
1
Liquidity risk  
18 a)  the exposure to the risk and how it arises; 1
19 b)  its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the 
previous period
1
Market Risk  
20 a)  the exposure to the risk and how it arises; 1
21 b)  its objectives, policies and process for managing the risk and the method used to measure the risk; and any changes from the 
previous period
1
Quantitative Disclosures  
Credit risk information  
22 The amount that best represents financial instruments’ maximum credit risk exposure 1
23 Significance concentrations of credit risks for each class of financial instruments 1
Liquidity risk information  
24 Maturity analysis for derivative and non-derivative financial liabilities including financial guarantee contracts; and description of 
how it manages the liquidity risk.
1
Market risk information  
25 Sensitivity analysis for each type of market risk, the methods and assumption used, as well as any changes from prior period, with 
the asons for such changes
1
* Source: MFRS 7 on Financial Instruments: Disclosures
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